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It does not necesarily follow that because no action will lie for such excavation until some subsidence of the plaintiff's
land, that, therefore, a new action may
be maintained .for every succeeding subsidence; and the point involved in the
principal case is so novel and so delicate, there has been so much conflict of

opinion on it in England, and so little
consideration of it in this country, that
it must be considered an open one with
us, and deserving the most careful examination whenever it shall properly
arise.
EDUeuND H. BENNETT.
Boston.
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Supreme Court of Kentucky.
SULLIVAN, &c., v. KUYKENDALL.
Where A., desiring to talk over the telephone with B., asked the operator to call
him, and the operator thereupon had a conversation with B., reporting to A., who
was standing by, what B. said as it came over the wire, held, in a subsequent action
between A. and B. the former might prove by himself and others what the operator
reported to him as coming from B., the operator being called and not remembering
the conversation.
The fact of mailing a letter, properly addressed, with postage prepaid, creates no
legal presumption that it was duly received ; but it is merely a fact which is to be
weighed along with other -evidence in determining the question, and to which no
more presumption attaches than to any other fact.

APPEAL from Warren Circuit Court.
Ransell & Mitche1l, B. T.

Hines, for appellants.

N. A. Porter,for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLT, J.-By the terms of a verbal contract for the sale of personal property the appellants, Sullivan & Co., were to estimate and
receive~it within ten days after notice from the appellee, Kuykendall, that it was ready.
On January 26th 1880, he wrote them a letter, which by due
course of mail should have been received by them within the next
two days, but which in point of fact, as the testimony shows, was
not received until February 17th 1880, notifying them that the
property would be ready for them on February 9th 1880.
About February 11th or 12th 1880, Green river began rising
and by the 13th of the same month had overflowed its banks; and
the property being along them, was in the main destroyed.
The letter above named was properly enveloped, stamped and
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deposited in the post-office, and addressed to the appellants at their
usual post-office.
The lower court in substance instructed the jury that if they
believed from the evidence that said letter was written, addressed
to the appellants at their proper post-office, duly stamped, and
placed in the office, then the presumption was that it was received
in due course of mail; and that this presumption must prevail,
unless overthrown by satisfactory evidence, that it was not so
received.
This instruction was doubtless based upon the statement to be
found in some text-books, and a few cases to the effect that when a
letter is sent by the post it is to be presumed from the known course
in that department of the public service that it reached its destination at the usual time, and was received by the person to whom it
was addressed, if living there, and usually receiving his letters at
that place.
It will be found, however, that the most of these cases go no farther than to hold that, in the absence of all other evidence upon
the point, the mailing of a letter, properly directed, raises a presumption that it was received; and that this presumption must
prevail unless rebutted by other testimony.
In the leading case of Buntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 891, the
learned judge (GRAY, J.,) said that the depositing of a letter in
the post-office, addressed to a merchant at his place of business, is
prima facie evidence that he received it in the ordinary course of
mail; but that the jury should be so instructed only in the absence
of other testimony upon the point.
The case of Bussell v. Buckley, 4 R. I. 525, is to the same
effect; while authority is abundant that the mailing of a letter
creates no presumption whatever that it was duly received.
In United States v. Babcock, 3 Dillon's 0. C. Rep. 571, Judge
DILLON uses this language: " Upon the subject of the admissibility
of letters, by one person addressed to another, by name, at his
known post-office address, prepaid and actually deposited in the
post-office, we concur, both of us, in the conclusion, adopting the
language of Ohief Justice BIGELOW in Commonwealth v. cJeffries,
7 Allen 563, that this is evidence tending to show that such letters
reached their destination, and were received by the persons to whom
they were addressed."
"This is not a conclusive presumption; and it does not even
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create a legal presumption that such letters were actually received;
it is evidence tending, if credited by the jury, to show the receipt
of such letters."
In the case of negotiable paper it has long been held that the
depositing of a letter in the post-office by the holder to the indorsers
is not only good prima facie evidence, but sufficient to establish
the fact that notice was given; but this rule has been established
by the law merchant through commercial necessity.
By the common law this presumption did not exist even as to
negotiable paper; and after a careful examination of the authorities
we are satisfied that it ought not to be held to arise in ordinary business transactions, and especially between men whose business does
not require them to watch the arrival of the mails: Freeman v.
Morey, 4 Me. 50; Nat. Bank v. JeManigle, 69 Penn. St. 156;
Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, &c., 4 Allen 447.
The mailing of the letter in this instance created no leqal presumption, but was proper testimony to be considered by the jury,
together with the other evidence, in determining when it was received ; and they should not have been instructed that a presumption arose from it, which must prevail unless overthrown by other
satisfactory evidence.
The instructions in other respects were unobjectionable.
The appellants relied upon an alleged new contract between them
and the appellee, by which the one sued upon was annulled; but
this was a question of fact as to which the testimony was conflicting,
and the finding of the jury would not therefore be disturbed, if this
were the only question presented by this appeal.
In view of another trial of the case it is proper that we should
pass upon what seems to us to be a new question as tW the competency of certain testimony; at least we have been unable to find
any direct authority upon it.
The appellee upon going to the place, on February 9th 1880,
where the property was to be received did not find the appellants or
any one representing them there.
He thereupon went to a telephone office at Morgantown, Kentucky, for the purpose of .communicating with the appellants at
Bowling Green, Kentucky; and not being accustomed to the use
of the instrument he got the operator to talk for him. He first
directed him to call for the appellant, Sullivan, and he did so, the
Bowling Green operator reporting back that he would send for him
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to come to the office. Presently the Morgantown operator told the
appellee that Sullivan was at the Bowling Green office and desired
to know what was wanted; and thereupon a conversation took place,
Sullivan using the instrument himself while the Morgantown operator talked for the appellee, and told him what Sullivan said as it
came over the wire.
' The latter testifies that on that day he had a conversation over
the telephone with some one at Morgantown, and upon the same
subject to which the appellee says the conversation related; but
they differ widely as to what was said. The Morgantown operator,
being introduced as a witness, testifies that upon the day named he
had a conversation upon that subject with some one at Bowling
Green, whom the operator there told him was Sullivan, but that he
does not recollect what was said. Under this state of case the court
below permitted the appellee to prove by himself and two other
persons, who were present at the time, what the Morgantown operator reported to appellee, while the conversation was going on over
the wire, as being said by Sullivan.
It is certain that the latter did talk over the wire, because he says
so. The appellee did not pay the telephone charge; and it does
not appear who did, save the Bowling Green operator reported to
the Morgantown one that Sullivan would do so; and the latter is
silent upon this point.
It would beyond question have been competent to prove by the
Morgantown operator what Sullivan said to him; but whether his
report to the appellee of what Sullivan was saying, made as the
conversation progressed, is competent or falls within the domain of
incompetent hearsay testimony, is a question of importance in view
of the astonishing growth of the business to which it relates, and
one not free from difficulty.
In the case of a telegram the original must usually be produced
in evidence, or its loss shown, before its contents can be proven or
the copy delivered by the operator to the party receiving the message used, unless it be where the copy becomes primary testimony
by the telegraph company being the agent of the sender.
In the use of the telephone, however, the parties talk with each
other as if face to face; and, save where a message is sent, there is
no written evidence of what has passed. By inventive means they
are brought together for the transaction of business.
It is a well settled rule that where one through an interpreter
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makes statements to another, the interpreter's statement made at
the time of what was so said is competent evidence against the
party.
The interpreter need not be called to prove it; but the interpreter's statement made at the time may be proven by third persons
who were present and heard it: Camerlin v. Palmer Co., 10 Allen
539; Schearer v. Ilarber, U6 Ind. 536; 1 Greenl. Ev., sect. 183;
1 Phillips's Ev. *519.
The reason of this rule is, that the interpreter is the agent of both
parties, and acting at the time within the scope of his authority;
and we have been unable to draw any satisfactory distinction
between this case and the one under consideration.
The argument is at least plausible, if not correct, that the
testimony in question is competent as a part of the res gestce, aside
from the question of agency.
It is true the parties cannot see each other; but the statements
of an interpreter between blind persons could be proven by third
parties, without calling the interpreter as a witness; and by
telephonic means persons are as much together for all purposes
of conversation and actors in what may be occurring as if they were
immediately present with each other.
We must not be understood, however, as holding the testimony
competent upon the above ground, because there is another reason
for so ruling which is conclusive to our minds.
Subject to various qualifications the old rule that a party must
produce the best evidence within his power to prove a fact should
govern. But as business expands by the aid of new inventions
wider scope must be given to the rules of evidence. There is'no
need, however, of any departure or innovation in this case, because
it is a well-settled rule of evidence that the statements of an agent,
when acting within the scope of his agency, are competent against
his principal. When one is using the telephone, if he knows that he is talking
to the operator, he also knows that he is making him his agent to
repeat what he is saying to another party; and in such a case certainly the statements of the operator are competent, being the
declarations rf the agent made during the progress of the transaction.
If he is ignorant whether he is talking to the person with whom
he wishes to communicate or with the operator, or even any third
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party, yet he does it with the expectation and intention on his part
that in case he is not talking with the one for whom the information
is intended, that it will be communicated to that person; and he
thereby makes the person receiving it his agent to communicate
what he may have said. This should certainly be the rule as to an
operator, because the person using a telephone knows that there is
one at each station whose business it is to so act; and we think that
the necessities of a growing business require this rule, and that it
is sanctioned by the known rules of evidence.
Judgment reversed.
Judge PRYOR delivered the following dissenting opinion.-The
question decided in this case is novel and of great importance to
the commercial world.
The terms of a contract are attempted to be established by messages alleged to have been forwarded by one to the other of the
parties over a line of telephone extending from Morgantown to
Bowling Green.
The appellee being desirous of showing that the appellant agreed
to receive a lot of hoop-poles on the bank of Green river within a
a certain time, applied to the telephone agent at Morgantown to
ascertain from Sullivan, the appellant, at Bowling Green, why he
did not attend for the purpose of receiving the poles. The agent
at Morganstown telephoned to the agent at Bowling Green in regard
to Sullivan, who sent a message back that Sullivan was present at
Bowling Green and would answer for himself.
The message sent by Sullivan was (as Sullivan swears, and that
fact is nowhere contradicted), to the effect that he had not been
notified that the hoop-poles were ready, and therefore did not send
to receive them. The appellee says that the message he received
from Sullivan at Bowling Green was, that the agent of appellant
was sick and for that reason did not send him down. This is
denied by Sullivan, and the operator at Morgantown recollects that
the message was in regard to the hoop-poles, but fails to recollect
what it was. The apppllee was then allowed to prove what the agent
at Morgantown told him as to the character of the message, and
that was " that he failed to send because Allen was sick." He was
also allowed to prove, by one or two others in the room, that the
telegraph operator at Morgantown made that statement to the appellee. It is not pretended that either the appellee or those present
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heard what was said by the appellant, and all they know as to the
nature of the response made to appellee's inquiry is what was told
them by the operator, who does not himself recollect what the
response was. It is difficult to understand upon what principle this
testimony is to be admitted. It cannot be said that the operator at
Morgantown was the agent of Sullivan, the appellant, at Bowling
Green, and for that reason his admissions are binding on the principal. Nor can it be said that he was the agent of Sullivan for the
purpose of ascertaining what the contract was, but on the contrary he
was the agent of the appellee. The latter wanted this agent to
inquire of Sullivan, who doubtless did not even know him, why he had
failed to take the hoop-poles on a named day, and the information
was given him by Sullivan, as the latter admits. But this admission appellee says is untrue, because the agent of the appellee told
other parties, not in the presence of Sullivan, that the reason you
failed to come was that your man was sick. The agent don't recollect what the message was, but those present recollect what the
agent said it was.
A telephone agent who makes an inquiry through the telephone
for the benefit of and at the instance of another, is not made the
agent of the party responding. The relation of principal and agent
cannot arise farther than to admit the testimony of the operator as
to what the conversation was. He will not be allowed to close his
mouth, and others permitted to testify as to his statements of what
passed between him and the party sought to be made liable.
The human voice, by means of this remarkable discovery, may be
heard at almost any distance.
It requires neither science or
skill to use it as a means of conversation, and the result is that
almost any one in the office may be called on to use it for others,
and to establish the rule that the declarations of the one receiving
the message as to the substance of the response made are evidence
is subversive not only of a well recognised rule of evidence, but
dangerous in its application.
The operator is not an interpreter in a legal sense. When persons of different nationalities are unable to understand each other
they call on an interpreter, and he speaks for them-in their presence-those present hear his statements. This is original testimony, as much so as if the same witnesses were present and heard
the parties themselves conversing with each other. There is no
analogy between the case of an interpreter and that of a telephone
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operator. Here the parties conversing are miles apart ; the one is
called to respond to the other; when Sullivan responds he is responding to Kuykendall, although through the agency of another.
That operator can swear to what the statements were, but his declarations are no more competent than if Kuykendall himself had
talked to Sullivan, and reported to others what Sullivan said. If
ihe operator's statements are competent, so would Kuykendall's
have been if he had made the inquiry and heard the response.
That one may constitute another, his agent, by telephone is not
questioned, but that one who responds to an inquiry makes the
party to whom he responds such an agent as that the latter's declarations are competent against him, I deny.
To illustrate the position assumed in this case, and leaving the
telephone for a brief moment: the appellee sends the operator at
Morgantown to Bowling Green to know of Sullivan why he failed
to take the timbers. He makes the inquiry of Sullivan, and reports to those present in the room at the time that Sullivan told
him it was because "Allen was sick." This Sullivan denies. Is
it then competent for Kuykendall to prove by those present (the
operator not recollecting) what report the operator made to them ?
If Sullivan heard what the operator said to the bystanders it would
be competent, or if it could be inferred that he heard what was said
it might be competent, but when you concede that he did not hear,
as must have been the case when he was telephoned, it would be
clearly incompetent. The operator would be as much the agent of
Sullivan in the one case as in the other, but really not the agent in
either instance.
Two merchants on one side of Main street propose to buy 100
barrels of pork from a merchant on the opposite side. The one
directs his clerk to telephone the merchant on the opposite side of
the street that he will give him ten dollars per barrel for the 100
barrels. The clerk telephones and reports the response to his principal and those present that the proposition is accepted. The other
merchant, who has no telephone, directs his clerk to step to the door
and call the merchant'on the opposite side, making the same proposition. He does so and reports an acceptance of the proposition.
The merchant refuses to deliver the pork in either instance, because
he says he agreed to take twelve dollars per barrel, and this was his
response, and he proves this to have been the response made by
himself and those present. The two clerks fail to recQllect what the
response was, but it is offered in each instance to prove the report
VOL. XXXIII.-57
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made by the two clerks to their principal, and in this manner contradict the statements of those who heard the response made. Can
such testimony be competent ? It is certainly incompetent in the
one case and not competent in the other, unless the necessities of
trade connected with this new discovery requires a departure from a
well recognised rule of evidence.
It is at last a question solely as to what the conversation was.
Those who heard it are competent witnesses, but their statements
to others as to what they heard are inadmissible.
Suppose Sullivan, instead of talking himself, had conversed
through the operator at Bowling Green, then the statements of the
operator at Morgantown, according to the principal opinion, could
be competent to contradict the oath of the operator at Bowling
Green as to the message sent by him. That this could be done if
the operator at Morgantown was called as a witness is not doubted,
but his statements to others as to the conversation should have
been excluded. Nor can such testimony be admitted upon the
ground that it was the best testimony the appellee, under the circumstances, could produce. Such a rule would open the door for all
hearsay testimony.
Such agents could easily be found willing to report a conversation to others that they would not swear to themselves.
It is maintained, however, that this operator was an agent, and
acting within the scope of his authority, and therefore his statements
are admissible. What was the scope of his authority ? Are the
statements of an agent for a special purpose admissible to prove the
extent of his authority ? If so it is a novel doctrine. The acts of
an agent may be permitted so as to presume general authority, but
where the power is special and he departs from it, his transaction is
void. So if A. authorizes B. to tell C. that he will take his poles on
a fixed day, and B. tells him that A. will take them ten days prior
to that time, there being no other agency, he has no power to bind
A., and certainly his statements are not competent to show the extent of the special agency.
The testimony is purely hearsay, and all the reasons induced by
consideration of both public and private interests for excluding that
character of testimony apply with great force to this case. While
I concur in the reversal of the judgment, I must dissent from so
much of the opinion as authorizes the admission of this testimony.
It is well settled that a prima facde
presumption that a letter was duly re-

ceived, arises, in the absence of opposing
evidence, from proof that it was de-
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posited in the post-office properly addressed with the postage prepaid. This
presumption is based on the probability
that the officers of the g6vernmnet will
do their duty, and that letters will be
duly delivered : 1 Greenl. Ev., ?. 40,
and cases cited ; Hutntley v. Whittier,
1.05 Mass. 391 ; Brigqs v. lierrey, 130
Id. 187. This presumption is not a
conclusive presumption : Freeman v.
Morcy, 45 Me. 50 ; Greeinield Bank v.
Crqfts, 4 Allen 451, 457 ; Frst LNat.
Bank v. Ma.lfanigle, 69 Penn. St, 159.
In delivering the opinion of the court
in fluntley v. Whittier, supra, GRAY, J.,
said : "The depositing of a letter in the
post-office, addressed to a merchant at
his place of business, is prima fade evidence that he received it in the ordinary

The second point involved in that
case is one of more difficulty, concerning which we have found no decisive
adjudicated cases. We have read the
opinion of the majority of the court, and
the dissenting opinion of Judge PRYOR,

with great interest, as well as the cases
referred to by the majority of the court
in support of their conclusions ; and
from the best consideration we have
been able to bestow upon the case, we
are unable to coincide with the opinion
of the majority of the court. The case
does not seem to us to be analogous to
that- of an interpreter. In the case of
an interpreter, the ground of the admissibility, as against both parties, of evidence of what he said is that be was the
agent of both parties. If one were to
instruct another to make a simple comcourse of the mails; and where there is
nmunication 'in a foreign language to a
no other evidence, the jury should be so
instructed :" PARsOxS, C. J., in Munn. third party, to which no answer was
given, no one would contend that such
v. Baldwin, 6 Mass. 316, 317. PARKFn,
an interpreter was the agent of the party
C. J., Dana v. Kemble, 19 Pick. 112,
114. GIBSONe, C. J., in Callan v. Gay- to whom the communication was made.
lord, 3 W,atts 321 ; Oaks Y. Weller, 16 In the case of an ordinary interpreter,
Vt. 63 ; Russell v. Buckley, 4 R. I.
the interpreter is authorized mutually to
make communications and to receive
525 ; 1 Greenl. Ev., 40 ; 1 Tayl. Ev.
The
(5th ed.)
147. The presumption so and interpret answers thereto.
views above stated are sustained
arising is not a conclusive presumption
both by principle and authority. Mr.
of law, but a mere inference of fact,
founded on the probability that the
Greenleaf says: "The admissions of a
third party are also receivable in eviofficers of the government will do their
dence against the party who has exduty, and the usual course of business;
and when it is opposed by evidence that. pressly referred another to him for
the letter was never received, must be information in regard to an uncertain
or disputed matter. In such cases the
weighed with all the otler circumstances
of the case by the jury in determining
party is bound by the declarations of the
the question whether the letter was persons referred to, in the same manner
actually received or not; and the burand to the same extent as if they were
made by himself." 1 Greenl. Ev., 182.
den of proving its receipt remains
throughout upon the party who asserts
" This principle extends to the case of
it: Crane v. Pratt, 12 Gray 348; Green- an interpreter, whose statements of what
the party says are treated as identical
field Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447.
with those of the party himself, and,
A similar rule prevails as to teletherefore, may be proved by any person
graphic despatches : United States v.
who heard them, without calling the interBabcock, 3 Dill. C. 0. 571 ; Com. v.
Jqffries, 7 Allen 563.
preter:" 1 Gr. Eq., 883. See, also,
The decision of the first point of the
the cases of Fabrigasv. Mlostyn, 20 How.
principal case, appears, then, to be, beSt. Pr. 122, 123; Camerlin v. Palmer
yond controversy, correct.
Co., 10 Allen 539.
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That the ground of the admissibility
of such evidence is that of agency, is
rendered more apparent from the fact
that the rule does not apply to the case
of an interpreter of a witness in a court
of justice. Such an interpreter is not
an agent of the party calling him, but
rather an officer of the court ; and evidence of what the interpreter testified on
a former trial as having been received
by him in a foreign language from a
witness on such trial, cannot be given in
evidence unless the interpreter be dead,
insane, out of the jurisdiction, or sick
and unable to testify, or having been
subpcenaed, appears to have been kept
away by the adverse party: Schearer v.
Barber, 36 Ind. 536.
The ground, then, of the admissibility
of evidence of what was said by an interpreter, being agency, how could the appellant be understood to confer authority
upon the operator at Morgantown to
repeat his communication, when, so far
as we can discover from the case, it does
not appear .that he even knew that he
was conversing with appellee through a
third person ?
Passing the point as to interpreters,
-the majority of the court appear to have
put their decision upon the simple ground
of agency. As we have just stated, we
are unable to understand how one can
be held to confer authority upon an agent
of whose existence he is not, so far as
we can learn from the case, shown to
have been aware. So far as we know,
the general custom is for parties using a
telephone, to use it in person; or, as

stated by the court in the principal case,
1 the parties talk with each other as if
face to face ;" and the statement that
if the appellee was ignorant whether he
was talking to the person with whom
he wished to communicate or with the
operator, or even any third party, he did
it with the expectation and intention, on
his part, that in case lie was not talking
with the one for whom the information
was intended, it would be communicated
to that person, is a pure assumption of a
fact vital to the determination of the
case. Where one sends an agent with a
verbal message to another, expecting an
answer, does the party answering make
the agent of the sender his agent also,
so that evidence of what the agent reported to his principal can be given by
any third person who happened to hear
it? If such is the case, it behooves business men to be careful not to make other
than written answers to such communications. The case in question seems to
be exactly such a case, and to hold otherwise seems to us a perversion of the
established rules of evidence. The dissenting opinion of Judge PayoR, to our
mind, places the case in its proper light
and lays down the proper rule of law,
that IIa telephone agent who makes an
inquiry through the telephone for the
benefit of and at the instance of another,
is not made the agent of the party responding ;" while the decision of the case
by the majority of the court seems to ns
supported neither by principle nor auM. D. EWELL.
thority.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
JERRY DARRIGAN v. THE NEW YORK AND NEW ENGLAND
RAILROAD COMPANY.
A train dispatcher is not a fellow servant with the employees in charge of a train,
within the rule relieving the master from liability for injuries caused to a servant by
the negligence of a fellow servant.
It is the duty of a railroad company to devise some suitable and safe method of
running special and irregular trains, so as to avoid collision, and where the method
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employed is to have the trains controlled by a train dispatcher, the latter as to employees in charge of trains stands in the place of the company.
The rules governing the liability of i master for injuries to his servant discussed.

IN error.

. ff. Briscoe and J. P. Andrews, for plaintiff in error.
S. -E. Baldwin and E. D. Bobbins, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-On December i4th 1882, there were two special or irregular trains going in opposite directions on the western
division of the defendants' single track railroad. These trains were
run as directed by telegrams from the train dispatcher in the division superintendent's office at Hartford. The train going east was
a construction train. About 12 o'clock it was at Southport station,
where it received an order from the train dispatcher to run to Towantic as a special train ahead of INo. 6, and then to work between
Towantic and Waterbury as a special train until 6 o'clock P. mr.,
protecting themselves against Globe special east after 1.30 !. m.
The above order was given by the chief train dispatcher. Soon
after he was relieved in the regular course of business by an assistant. A little before 5 o'elbck the same afternoon, the plaintiff's
train going west received at Waterbury from the assistant train
dispatcher an order to run to Brewster's as a special. In obeying
this order the two trains collided and the plaintiff was seriously
injured. The court below rendered judgment for the plaintiff and
the defendant appealed.
The negligence of the train dispatcher is admitted; but the defendant claimed that such negligence was the negligence of a fellow
servant, for which it is not liable; and that is the first question
presented for our consideration.
In Wilson v. The Willimantic Linen Go., 50 Conn. 433, this
court held that a master was bound to provide for his servant a
reasonably safe place for his work and reasonably safe appliances.
An application of that principle to a railroad company would require it to keep its road bed, rolling stock, tools and implements, in
good and safe condition ; to adopt rules and regulations adapted to
its business, so as to guard against accidents; and to employ skilful and competent agents and employees in every department of its
service. In short, all employers shall be vigilant in the use of

DARRIGAN v. N. Y. & N. E. RAILROAD CO.

means and in the adoption of measures to make the servants in their
employ reasonably safe. To that extent the master assumes the
risk. On the other hand the servant assumes the natural and ordinary risks incident to the business, including those arising from the
negligence of his fellow servants. To a certain extent the distinction between the two classes of risks is obvious and in most cases
it is easy to determine on which side of the dividing line the case
falls; but along the line on either side is a wide margin of debatable ground. It would be idle to attempt to notice any considerable
number of the many cases that have been decided on this subject.
They are so conflicting that it is impossible to reconcile them, and
it is equally impossible to extract from them any general rule or
principle by which future cases or any considerable portion of them
may be determined. Differing views are entertained by different
courts in similar cases. To some extent each case is determined
by the peculiar circumstances attending it. iNor are the courts uniform in their statement of the principles upon which the master's
exemption rests. In an early case the servants are represented as
engaged in a joint undertaking, in which no one, as respects the
other, represents ihe master, and which each in his separate department, does represent his principal, and in which each stipulates for
the performance of his several part. Other cases place it upon the
ground that there is an implied contract by the servant to assume
risks arising from the negligence of his fellow servants; and others
still rest it upon grounds of public policy. On whatever ground it
is placed the practical difficulty remains-who are fellow servants,
and who represent the company ?
In Chicago, A. & St. P. By. Co. v. Boss, 24 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 94, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a divided
court, held that the company was liable to an engineer for the negligence of the conductor. The court say: "There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be made in their relation to their common principal between servants of a corporation exercising no
supervision over others engaged with them in the same employment,
and agents of the corporation, clothed with the control and management of a distinct department, in which their duty is entirely that
of direction and superintendence. A conductor, having the entire
control and management of a railway train, occupies a very different
position from the brakeman, the porters, and other subordinates
employed. He is, in fact, and should be treated as, the personal
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representative of the corporation, for whose negligence it is responsible to subordinate servants. This view of his relation to the
corporation seems to us a reasonable and just one, and it will insure
more care in the selection of such agents, and thus give greater
security to the servants engaged under him in an employment
requiring the utmost vigilance on their part and prompt and
unhesitating obedience to his orders. The rule which applies to
such agents of one railway corporation must apply to all, and many
corporations operate every day several trains over hundreds of miles
at great distances apart, each being under the control and direction
of a conductor specially appointed for its management. We know
from the manner in which railways are operated that, subject to the
general rules and orders of the directors of the company, the conduetor has entire control and management of the train to which he
is assigned. He directs when it shall start, at what speed it shall
run, at what stations it shall stop and for what length of time, and
everything essential to its successful movements; and all persons
employed on it are subject to his orders. In no proper sense of the
term is he a fellow servant with the fireman, the brakeman, the
porters and the engineer. The latter are fellow servants in the
running of the train under his direction, who as to them and
the train stands in the place of and represents the corporation."
Then after citing several cases the court adds: "We agree with
them in holding--and the present case requires no further decision
-that the conductor of a railway train, who commands its movements, directs when it starts, at what stations it shall stop, at what
speed it shall run, and has the general management of it, and control over the persons employed upon it, represents the company,
and therefore that, for injuries resulting from his negligent acts, the
company is responsible." We do not make these quotations as
necessarily expressing our views upon a case like that, for the case
at bar does not call for it, but for the purpose of showing the
position of that court.
In Sheehan v. N. Y. . & . B. Rd., 91 N. Y. 332, the facts
were these: Train 1A
337," an irregular or special train, called
" Wild Cat," was going west from Auburn. Train "50" was a
regul'ar train going east from Cayuga. The latter was due at Cayuga
at 4.40 P. i., and would go east at 4.45 by schedule. At 4.46 the
superintendent telegraphed to "337," "Wild Cat to Cayuga regardless of No. 50." No notice was given to "50," and no rule of the
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company required it, but the superintendent telegraphed to the telegraph operator at Cayuga to hold No. 50 for orders. The operator
told the conductor to hold No. 50 for train No. 61. He neither
exhibited- nor delivered any message; no rule of the company required him to do either. No. 61 came in soon after and No. 50
started towards Auburn. In a few moments it collided with "337,"
and the plaintiff was injured. The court say : "It was not disputed
at the trial, nor is it upon this appeal, that the dispatching of train
337-"' Wild Cat"-and the holding of train "50," were within the
province of the superintendent, nor that, in respect. thereto, be represented the defendant in its corporate capacity. Clearly he held
that relation.
The defendants' counsel in commenting upon that case, suggest
that the case turned upon the defective nature of the general rules
governing the movement of trains, which permitted the telegraph
operator to deliver a train order verbally to the conductor. In respect to this, the court say : "The peremptory order of the superintendent to go forward regardless of No. 50 was an assurance that
the track would be free and safe for the journey, and required the
defendants to take reasonable precautions to make it so. The rules
of the company did not require Kieffer, the telegraph operator, to
submit the message received by him to the conductor or engineer of
train No. 50, nor a communication back from these persons that
they had received and understood the order; an omission of either
circumstance was the act of the defendants and in the absence of
other precautions might properly be held to constitute negligence."
It is obvious that the court regarded the superintendent, who
acted as train dispatcher, as the representative of the corporation,
and his negligence was the negligence of the defendants. He failed
to give an effective order to hold No. 50, which he might and should
have done, regardless of rules. In that he, and through him the
company was negligent. And none the less so that the company
had failed to establish suitable rules. The intimation of the court
is clear that the company was responsible on both grounds.
In Ohicago, Burlington 4 Quincy Bd. Co. v. McSallen, 84 Ill.
109, the conductor of a special freight train received an order from
the assistant superintendent directing him to run fifteen minutes
behind the time of a regular freight train. In doing so he came
in collision with a regular passenger train going in the opposite direction.
The conductor was killed. No notice was given to
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the passenger train. The company was held liable. The court say:
"As between the conductor and company, the assistant superintendent, to whose orders the trains are all subject, is the representative
of the corporation. His orders to the conductor of a train are essentially the orders of the employer. This rule applies as well to
all orders issued by his assistants in office and issued in his name.
These orders were all signed in the name of Campbell, the assistant superintendent. If those intrusted by him with the arrangement of the business of the corporation, by orders issued in his
name, neglect to issue a necessary order, that is his neglect and the
negligence of the corporation."
In Kansas, in a similar case, the court say : "And those higher
officers, agents or servants cannot, with any degree of propriety, be
termed fellow servants with the other employees who do not possess
any such extensive powers and who have no choice but to obey such
superior officers, agents or servants. Such officers, agents or servants must be deemed in all cases, when they act within the scope
of their authority, to act for their principal, and, in fact, to be the
principal." It is conceded by the defendant's counsel that in Ohio,
Illinois, Tennessee and Kentucky, the law is substantially as indicated by the authorities above referred to.
On the other hand it must be conceded that the cases above named
and others of like import, are a departure from the general current
of authorities elsewhere. A conductor and brakeman have been
held to be fellow-servants in Indiana and Michigan : Thayer v. St.
Louis, &c., Ry. Co., 22 Ind. 26; Smith v.
Ri. Co., 46 Mich.
258. So also an overseer and a laborer under his charge. Brown
v. Winona, &c., Bty. Go., 27 Minn. 162; and a foreman and workman under him. Keystone Bridge Co. v. NAewbury, 96 Penn. St.
246; .Daubert v. Pikel,4 Mo. App. 591; Hath v. Peters, 55
Wis. 405; Peterson v. Goal &. Mining Go., 50 Iowa 674. In
Massachusetts they have pretty rigidly adhered to the doctrine of
the leading case of Parwell v. Boston & Worcester Rd. Co., 4 Met.
49. In one case there was an apparent weakening; Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 110 Mass. 260 ; but the court soon took pains
to prevent that case from being regarded as a departure from the
general rule." Holden v. Fitchburg RailroadCo., 129 Mass. 268.
In that case GRAY, C. J., says, "If a master uses reasonable care
in employing suitable servants, in supplying and keeping in repair
suitable structures and engines, and in giving proper directions and
VOL.
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taking due precautions as to their use, he is not responsible to one
servant for the negligence of another in the management and use
of such structures and engines in carrying on the master's work."
In another place he adds: "And it makes no difference that the servant whose negligence causes the injury, is a sub-manager or foreman of higher grade, or greater authority than the plaintiff."
In Feltham v. R'ngland, L. R., 2 Q. B. 33, it is said that the rule
of exemption is not altered by the fact that the servant, guilty of
negligence is a servant of superior authority, whose lawful directions the other is bound to obey.
In Wilson v. Merry, 4-c., L. R., 1 H. L. Scotch Appeals 326, the
Lord Chancellor says: "But what the master is,in my opinion,
bound to his servant to do, in the event of his not personally superintending and directing the work, is to select proper and competent
persons to do so, and to furnish them with adequate materials and
resources for the work. When he has done this he has, in my
opinion, done all that he is bound to do."
It seems to us that the rule prevailing in Massachusetts, and
which did prevail in England previous to the passage of the "Employers' Liability Act," hereinafter referred to, unduly enlarges the
exemption and confines the liability of employers within too narrow
limits. If such a rule had been followed in Wilson v. Willimantic
Linen Co., supra, the decision must have been otherwise. The
rule, we think, does not sufficiently recognise the distinction between
agents, managers, and even superintendents on the one hand, and
mere servants and common laborers on the other-between duties
which the master is required to perform and work which is ordinarily
performed by employees. It makes little allowance for emergencies,
and does not sufficiently regard the obvious fact that cases are constantly arising, especially in the operation of railroads, which no
general rule can provide for, in which the master must be regarded
as constructively present, in which, some one must be invested with
a discretion and a right to speak and command in his name and by
his authority. Such a right carries with it the corresponding duty
of obedience; some one must hear and obey.
To make no discrimination, but in all cases to place those who
are invested with authority to direct and control on the same footing with those whose duty it is merely to perform as directed without discretion and without responsibility, seems to us unwise and
impolitic.
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The duties of a master in most cases are easily distinguished from
those of an employee. The proprietor of a cotton mill is bound to
have a safe building, a safe dam or engine, and safe machinery; and
he is bound to keep them so. To do that he must employ skilled
mechanics, who perform his duties. Their negligence is his negligence. The English rule says that he has done his whole duty
when he has employed skilful, careful men to do this work. We
think that a more salutary rule would be to require him to see that
the work is actually done with care and skill; to require him to
inspect the work personally if competent, and if not, to employ
others who are, and who will exercise more than ordinary care, so
as to make it reasonably certain that the operatives will be surrounded by safe machinery and appliances. The liability of the
master for the negligence of such agents is a surer guarantee of
safety than immunity.
The diligence required will be the greater as the danger and
hazards increase. The operation of a railroad requires a greater
degree of care than the operation of a cotton mill.

It is the duty

of a railroad corporation to prepare a time-table and adjust the running of its trains so as to avoid collisions. It must also devise some
suitable and safe method by which to run special and irregular
trains, and regular trains when off their regular time. That cannot be done by general rules. Emergencies will arise which no
system of rules can anticipate and provide for, in which the company must act and act promptly and efficiently. In this case the
scheme devised was to have these trains controlled by one who knew
the position and movement of every train on the road liable to be
affected by them-a train dispatcher, acting in the name and by the
authority of the superintendent. Is there not a wide and manifest
difference between the duty of such an agent and the duty of a
locomotive engineer ? The duty of the former pertains to management and direction; that of the latter to obedience. It is immaterial that these men are hired and paid by a common employer,
and that their employment is designed to accomplish one common
result. That argunient, if pressed to its logical conclusion, would
obliterate all distinctions among those engaged in railroad business,
from the president down to the humblest servant, and would
practically exempt the company from all duty and all liability to
those in its service.
A reference to the rules of the company in connection with the
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facts will serve to show that the views above expressed are applicable to this case. Here were two irregular trains to be moved in
opposite directions on a single track railroad so as to pass each
other. It was necessary that their movements should be directed
by instructions emanating from some one intelligent source. The
rules of the company provide for moving trains by special orders.
One rule is, "All orders shall be given by a superintendent, or by
a dispatcher appointed for that purpose, under direction of a
superintendent; no other person will be allowed to give them."
Another rule is, "Division superintendents are supreme on their
respective divisions, and are responsible only to the management
for such orders as they may give." The following is from the
finding of the court: "So far as the printed rules and regulations
of the company did not govern, the train dispatcher was authorized
to give such orders for the movement and protection of trains as he
saw fit, and while so acting he had all the authority of, and acted
in the stead and place of, the division superintendent."
The train-dispatcher then, in respect to the matter of moving
these trains, was supreme. The whole power of the corporation,
whose duty it was to move them safely, was delegated to him. He
was the gent through whom the corporation attempted to perform
its duy. He acted in its name, by its authority, and in its stead.
The engineer was bound to obey his order. Disobedience or deviation would have been subversive of orders and discipline.- destructive in its consequences, and just cause for immediate dismissal.
He received an order to go west from Waterbury on a single track
road at a time when another train was approaching Waterbury from
the west. The order was imperative and it required of him implicit obedience. He obeyed. He did not then know the consequences, but the company did or should have known. He conformed
to the order, as he was bound to; and while so conforming, and as
the direct consequence thereof, he was injured. Reason, justice
and law require that the company should be held responsible.
Another rule provides that "in emergencies each employee must
promptly obey the orders of any superior officer." By that rule
the company made the order of that officer, whoever he may be,
and of whatever grade he may be, its own. If the order is an improper one, and, in executing it, another dmployee is injured, the
company should be responsible. In such a case the grade of service becomes and is material.
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That rule too, in its spirit had an application to the case. There
was something in the nature of an emergency. There was no room
for divided counsels; there must be unity of purpose and one mind
must control. That power and duty devolved upon the train dispatcher.
It is worthy of notice that the principles which we think should
govern this case have been embodied in an act of Parliament, and
are now the law of England. The decisions of her courts on this
question have been overruled by statute. In 1880, the "Employers' Liability Act" was passed, which is chap. 42, 43, 44 Victoria,
the first section of which is as follows: "When after the commencement of this act personal injury is caused to a workman (1) By
reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery
or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer;
or (2) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of
the employer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst
in the service of such superintendence; or (8) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders
or directions the workman at the time of the injury was bound to
conform, and did conform, when such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or (4) By reason of the act or omission of any
person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to
the rules or by-laws of the employer ; or (5) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has the
charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine or train
upon a railway. The workman, or, in case the injury results in
death, the legal personal representative of the workman, and any
person entitled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if theworkman had
not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer nor engaged
in his work."
The act limits the amount to be recovered in certain cases; and
will cease to be operative at the end of seven years unless re-enacted.
Among the rules of the company which had been placed in the
plaintiff's hands is the following; "The regular compensation of
employees covers all risk or liability to accident." The record does
not show that the defendant claimed in the court below that this was
equivalent to a contract exempting it from liability for its own negligence, nor do the reasons of appeal present any such question.
When such a question is presented we may be called upon to con-
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sider whether public policy will permit a railroad company to make
such a contract with its employees.
A new trial is not ordered.
The common law regulating the liability of masters for injuries received
by servants in the course of their service,
is thus stated by Chief Justice SHAw of
Massachusetts, in a case which has the
distinction of being cited as a leading
one in England as well as in America:
Farwell v. Boston 6- Worcester Rd., 4
Metcalf 49. (See also, Whart. on Neg.,
199 ; Thompson on Neg. 969 ; Totten
v. Penna. Rd., 11 Fed. Rep. 564.)
"He who engages in the employment
of another for the performance of specified duties and services for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and
ordinary risks and perils incident to
the performance of such services, and in
legal presumption, the compensation is
adjusted accordingly. And we are not
aware of any principle which should
except the perils arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who are
in the same employment." Further on
the chief justice says : " Where several
persons are employed, in the conduct of
one common enterprise or undertaking,
and the safety of each depends much on
the care and skill with which each shall
perform his appropriate duty, each is an
observer of the conduct of the others, can
give notice of any misconduct, incapacity
or neglect of duty, and leave the service
if the common employer will not take
such precautions and employ such agents
as the safety of the whole party may
require."
Certain limitations of this law must be
noticed. The master must take care to
provide good servants and suitable tools
if he would avoid liability, but it is only
reasonable care that the law exacts ; the
master is not an insurer.
For instance, machinery need not be
fitted with the latest appliances if it is
strong and safe with ordinary care:

2 Thompson on Neg. 982-3; A. T. & S.
F. Rd. v. fol., 29 Kans. 149 ; .3A.(4
Rd. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212 ; L. S. 411. S. Rd. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440.
It is even the doctrine of some courts
that the master is bound rather to good
faith than to care, and so may use defective machinery provided the workman knows its condition: Hagden v.
Tlafg. Co., 29 Conn. 548. Contra, Kain
v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 375. Afore care is
required of the employer where a child
is concerned than in the case of an adult
hand: Cooley on Torts 553 ; 2 Thompson on Neg. 977. If the master directs
work in person he is answerable for the
consequences of ordering hands into
positions of unusual danger: Miller v.
U. P. Rd., 17 Fed. Rep. 67; 2 Thompson on Neg. 974. If he turns over the
whole ordering of the work to a superintendent, then by the law of agency the
deputy stands in his principal's place.
But on the further point whether a
deputy clothed with partial authority
only-a foreman or upper servantstands in the master's place, a decided
change is taking place from the old rule
that a foreman is a fellow-servant with
others, and the master is, therefore, not
liable for his negligence. Almost all the
many decisions on this subject are railroad cases, where the question is the
responsibility of the company for the negligence of such subordinate officials as
track-masters, train-despatchers, conductors, engineers. It is impossible, here,
to take up the examination of the law of
every state. Suffice it to say that the
western and southern states have, most
of them, departed from the old rule. As
the principal case indicates, so has Connecticut. So, in a measure, has New
York. Pennsylvania keeps on the whole
to the old law, to which Massachusetts
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stoutly adheres: Malone v. lathaway,
64 N. Y. 5 ; Coal Co. v. Jone, 86 Penn.
St. 438. But see Aluilen v. P. S. Co.,
78 Id. 25; Lolden v. PA., 129 Mass.
268.
It was said by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, in a recent review
of the authorities, that no definition of
the term "fellow-servant," I applicable to
all cases, had yet been adopted by the
courts, and probably could not be. So
variant were the relations between master
and servants in different employments,
and so close the line of demarcation between co-laborers and middlemen, that
each case would have to stand upon its
own facts: Dobbin v. Rd., 81 N. C. 446.
Thus, also, it has been decided that
whether parties were fellow-servants was
a question for a jury: L j- St. L. Rd.
v. Morgenstern (Ill.), 12 Am. & Eng.
Rd. Cases 228. A principle upon
which the change in the law is based,
and with which, certainly, no fault can
be found, is that when the master delegates any duty which belongs to himself,
he is liable for its proper performance :
Hannibal 4- St. Joseph Rd. v. Fox
(Kans.), 15 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cases
325.
Starting with this principle, one way
of determining the line between a deputy
and a mere servant is by the ruling that
it is the absolute duty of the master to provide proper instrumentalitiesfor the conduct
of the business, and if he commits this
duty to a deputy, the master is nevertheless liable for its performance. This
rule is well illustrated by two Minnesota cases: Drymala v. Thompson, 26
Minn. 40; Brown v. Rd., 15 Am. &
Bng. Rd. Cases (Minn.) 333. In the
first of these a train hanai was hurt by
cars being thrown from the track where
the section-master, in repairing, had
taken up a rail and had omitted to send
out signals to warn approaching trains.
" Here," said the court, in effect, "the
track is an instrumentality necessary to
the working of the road which it is the

master's absolute and personal duty to
keep in repair, and as the company delegated this duty to the track-master, it is
answerable to an employee for his neglect." In the other case a train ran into
some cars which had been left standing
upon the main track at a station, contrary to rule, and the engineer was inThe fault was that of the
jured.
station agent, who had charge of the station and the tracks about it. The court
said, in substance, after referring to the
previous case: "1Here was an improper
use of proper instrumentalities, and for
this the company ought not to be held
liable. Nor had the station agent any
general superintendence of a branch of
the business."
It is perhaps on this ground that it is
generally held that servants in charge
of the construction and repair of machinery are vice-principals: H. 4- T. 0.
Rd. v. Marcelles, 12 Am. & Eng. Rd.
Cases 231 ; Hough v. Pd., 100 U. S.
213.

Another mode of determining the line
between a deputy and a mere servant,
is by ruling that the master is liable !f
the negligent servant is in charge of some
department of the master's business. But
this " being in charge" must be more
than a mere right to oversee hands or
direct work ; it must be more than
getting higher pay, or holding a position of special skill. Not the relative
grade, but the nature of the duty, makes
the difference. There must be some responsibility, some "control or superior
authority over another" (McCn.&nY, J.,
charging jury, Gravelle v. Rd., 3 MeCrary 36.3), so as to put the deputy pro
tanto in the master's place : Fraker v.
Rd. (Minn.) 15 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cases
256 ; N. C. 6- St. L. Rd. v. Wheless,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 741, 15 Am. &Eng. Rd.
Cases, 315 ; C. 4- A. Rd. v. May, (Ill.)
Id. 320.

Thus, a railroad road-master-an
officer usually considered a vice-principal-has been held bot a vice-principal
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when he was acting for the occasion as a
mere foreman of a gang of laborers:
Hoke v. Rd., 11 Mo. App. 574.
The decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in C., .1. 4- St. P.
Rd. "v. Ross, 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
94, cited in the principal case, though by
a divided court-Justices MATTHEWS,
GRAY, BRADY and BLATCHFORD, dissenting-may mark a turning point in
the law. The facts are these: The conductor of a freight train received a telegram to lay over at a certain station to
allow a special train to pass. Instead
of notifying the engineer at once, as the
rules required, the conductor went into
the caboose and went to sleep. The
train did not stop at the station, collided
with the special, and the engineer was
killed. The company was held liable.
See also, Moon v. Rd., Ct. of App. of
Va., 20 Cent. L. J. 33.
A third and very common test for
determining the line between vice-principal and servant is, whether the party
has power to employ and discharge hands.
This is sometimes regarded as an absolute test, and sometimes as an element
to be considered in the case: T. M. Rd.
v. Whitmore, 58 Tex. 276; Tyson v.
Rd., 61 Ala. 554; C. 4- A. Rd. v.
May (Ill.), 15 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas.
320, and note; Henry v. Brady, 9 Daly
(N. Y.) 143. See also, Rd. v. Decker,
82 Penn. St. 119.
All three of the foregoing rules for
distinguishing between vice-principal
and servant, are illustrated in a late
Wisconsin case: Peschel v. C. Al. 64St.
P. Ry. (Nov. 1884), 21 N. W. Rep.
269. The plaintiff was injured while
engaged with other mechanics and laborers, under a foreman, in putting up a
A post,
water-tank and wind-mill.
called the anchor-post, had not been set
deep enough in the ground and gave
way, letting the hoisting tackle fall upon
the plaintiff. The foreman in charge of
the work had no general power to employ and discharge hands, though an-

thorized, in certain cases, to discharge a
man who did not give satisfaction and
The foremgn was
employ another.
himself under the orders of a mastercarpenter. It was held that the action
came not from defective machinery, for
which the master would be blamable,
but from a faulty setting in place of machinery good in itself, which was the
fault of the servants engaged in the work.
It was also held that the foreman was a
fellow-servant of the injured party.
It has been held tfiat a delegation of
authority will more readily be inferred
where the master is a corporation, but it
is not easy to deduce any rule on this
point, because there are so few cases
where the master is not a corporation.
In England no such distinction is admitted: Thompson on Neg. 1031, and
note; Brickner v. Rd., 49 N. Y. 672;
Patterson v. Rd., 76 Penn. St. 389;
Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5 ; Howells v. Steel Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 62.
In addition to the inquiry, who is to
be deemed a vice-principal? the law is
in a transition state as to the question,
when are workmen in a common employment? The general rule laid down by
Chief Justice SHAW, that they are in a
common employment who serve and are
paid by the same master, and aid in carrying out the same enterprise (Thompson on Neg. 1026), has been departed
from in some states where it is held,
those only are in a common employment
who may actually o. erlook each other's
work: Rd. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
27 ; McGowan v. Rd., 61 Mo. 528;
Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258 ; Rd. v.
Mkorgenstern, 106 Ill. 216. It has been
said to be the law in the federal courts
that common employment means the
same department of duty: GRE5sAir,
J., in King v. 0. 4- N. Rd., 11 Bissell
362.
We are now prepared to look at the
statutory changes in the law.
The fullest and most complete statute,
the English Employers' Liability Act of
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1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), provides
that workmen, or their representatives,
shall have an action against their employers (which includes associations,
corporate or incorporate,) for injuries or
death happening:
1. By reason of defects in "ways,
works, machinery, or plant," arising
from the employer's negligence, unless
the workman knew of the defect and
failed to give notice of it.
2. By reason of the negligence of any
one having superintendence entrusted to
him; or
3. By reason of the negligence of any
person to whose orders the workman was
bound to conform.
4. By reason of bad rules and regulations ; but none shall be bad which have
been approved by the proper department
of government.
5. By reason of the negligence of any
employee having " charge or control of
any signal, points, locomotive engine,
or train upon a railway."
The compensation to be recovered
may not exceed the estimated earnings
for three years previous, of workmen in
like employment and in the same district, as the injured person. Notice of
the injury must be given to the employer within six weeks, and suit begun
within six months, or in case of death
within twelve months, except that in
cases of death the judge may excuse the
lack of notice if he see fit. The act applies to railway servants and also to any
"laborer, servant in husbandry, journeyman-artificer, or otherwise engaged
in manual labor." By a hard though
possibly accurate interpretation of these
words, an omnibus conductor whose business it was to look out for passengers
and take fares, was held not "engaged
in manual labor": Morgan v. Omnibus
Co., L. R., 13 Q. B. Div. 832.
According to English law the employer must provide proper and safe
machinery, but the cases are not uniform
on the point whether if the employed
VOL. X XIII.-59

knows the machinery unsafe and makes
no complaint, lie may hold the employer
liable. We can come nearest to reconciling the decisions by saying with LoaD
CocxBua, not very definitely, it must
be admitted: "That the risks necessarily involved in the service must not
be aggravated by any omission on the
part of the master, to keep the machinery in the condition in which, from
the terms of the contract, or the nature
of the employment, the servant had a
right to expect it would be kept :"
Clarke v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937,
Whart. on Neg. 210. See also Dynenv.
Leach, 26 L. J. Ex. 221; Assop v.
Yates, 2 H. & N. 767; Weems v.
.3fathieson, 4 Macqueen H. L. Cas. 215.
But now the Employers' Liability Act
settles it, and as we think rightly, that
an employer is liable for defects in apparatus which he knows, or ought to
know of; for a man cannot contract that
he shall not be responsible for his own
neglect, nor is the negligence of an employer a risk incident to his servant's
employment. Thus, a case arose under
the act, where a man had been killed by
a lump of coke falling upon him from a
lift under which he was standing. The
sides of the lift ought to have been fenced
in. It was argued that the word ",defect" did not mean unfitness for the
purposes to which it was applied of a
machine perfect as far as it went, but
the court said that if a machine was not
suitable for the purposes it was used for,
of course it was defective: Heske v.
Samuelson, L. R., 12 Q. B. 30. A
"defect in condition of ways" means a
defect in the way itself; not an obstruction lying in it: McGifn v. Shipbuilding Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. Div. 1.
In making the master responsible for
the negligence of his superintendent,
and for bad rules and regulations, the
Employers' Liability Act is declaratory
of the existing law, but it introduces a
material change when it makes the employer answerable for the negligence of
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any one, "to whose orders the workman
was hound to conform." Hitherto the
English law on this point has been the
stricter rule that a deputy's negligence is
ch rgeable upon the principal only when
the delegation of authority is total, not
partial nor over a certain department of
work: Murphy v. Smith, 19 C. B. N. S.
361; Conway v. Belfast, 4-c., By., 11
Ir. R. C. L. 345.
This portion of the act also has been
eon.trued : One may be superintendent
although he occasionally assists in manual
labor, while on the other hand a man
whose duty it was to manage a guy-rope
on a crane and give directions when to
hoist and lower, has been held not a superintendent. Again, when a foreman
induced a boy by the promise of extra
pay to do- work which by a known rule
of the employer was forbidden to boys,
it was held that, in the circumstances,
the order was not one to which the boy
was bound to conform: Osborne v. Jackson, L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 619 ; Shafers
v. General Steam Nav. Co., L. R., 10
Id. 357 ; Bunker v. Midland By. Co., 47
L. Times 476.
Another and a radical change in the
law is wrought by the section of the act
which gives an action against the employer where an employee is killed or
injured by the negligence of a fellowworkman in charge or control of any
railway signals, trains, and so forth.
This provision abolishing the defence of
common employment, as far as certain
classes of railroad workmen are concerned, has been interpreted with some
exactness. A man having charge of a
set of trucks run by a hydraulic engine
along a line of railway, was held to have
"charge of a train." A nice distinction
was made in another case: A man who
worked under an inspector, and whose
business it was to clean and oil switches
and signals, after oiling some switch
gear, left the cover of the box which enclosed the gear projecting over the track,
so that a train was thrown off the rails.

It was decided that as his business was
only to oil and clean, he had not control
within the meaning of the act : Cox v.
G. W. By. Co., L. R., 9 Q. B. Div.
106; Gibbs v. G. W. By. Co., 11 Id.
22. The act includes a temporary railroad laid down by a contractor: Doughty
(A
v. Firbank, 10 Q. B. Div. 3*8.
steam crane fixed on a car is not a locomotive: Murphy v. Wilson, 52 L. J.,
Q. B. 524.)
Coming to this country, we find that
in Georgia a raiload is liable to one
employee for the negligence of another,
when the injured person is not chargeable with contributory negligence. Wisconsin has a similar statute: Code of
Georgia, " 2083, 2203, 3033, 3036;
Baker v. W. 4" A. Rd., 68 Ga. 699;
R. Stat. Wis. . 1816, Gumzv. C., M.
St. P. By., 52 Wis. 672. (This statute not class legislation : Ditberner v.
C. M. J- St. P. By., 47 Wis. 138.)
Statutes in Iowa and Kansas apply only
to persons operating railroads; not to
other railroad employees. This construction was put upon the Iowa statute,
and also upon the Kansas statute copied
from it, that they might not be open to
the eonstitutional objection of partial and
class legislation. McClain's Dig. (Iowa)
p. 357 : Compiled Laws of Kansas 1879,
p. 784; Deppe v. Rd., 36 Iowa 52;
Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Haley, 25 Kans. 35.
Accordingly, opening and closing the
doors of a round-house has been pronounced not connected with the operation of a railroad; nor is a section-hand
loading a car within the benefits of the
act, although he would be when going
over the line on a hand-car: Malone v.
Rd., 11 Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 165 ;
Smith v. Rd., 59 Iowa 73; Frandsen v.
Rd., 36 Id. 372.
In certain states (Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, West Virginia, Colorado),
statutes giving to "any person " injured the right to sue the railroad company, do not extend to employees. In
Kentucky it is otherwise: Carle T.
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Bangor, &c., Rd., 43 Maine 269; Rd.
V. Hughes, 49 Miss. 258; Proctor v.
Rd., 64 Mo. 112; A. T. 4- S._F. Ry.v.
Farrow 6 Col. 498; Randall v. B. 6 0.
Rd., S. C. U. S., 15 Am. & Eng. Rd.
Cas. 243; MeLeoct . Ginther, 80 Ky.
399. A Massachusetts statute prevents
employers evading by contract any liability which otherwise they might be
subject to, but imposes no new liability:
Mass. Gen. Stat. 1882, p. 422. Under
the English act, workman may contract
not to claim compensation: Griffiths v.
Dudley, L. R., 9 Q. B. 357.
We pass over the statutes in both
countries which establish regulations for
the government of mines and factories,
and make the owner answerable to his
employees for the disregard of these
regulations, because such statutes only
define the employer's negligence, and
introduce no new principles of law.
In studying the English Employers'
Liability Act, one cannot but be struck
with the evidences of care and attention
it displays. The act is careful to define
the terms it uses. By limiting the compensation which injured parties can recover, the plundering of employers
through the prejudices and sympathies
of juries is prevented. By the requirement that timely notice of injury sustained shall be sent to the employer, he
is enabled to know what he is sued for,
and need not fear lest all manner of
swindling actions be sprung upon him.
How much calling of witnesses and
wrangling of counsel will that clause of
the act dispense with, by which all rules
and regulations of employers are considered good which have the approval of
government.
Our own statutes are nmost of them
short articles or parts of articles in cedes,
and seem to be due rather to impulse
than to any thorough examination of the
law of master and servant.
It has no doubt been observed by the
reader, that all the American statutes
apply only to railroad employees, and

that the English act makes its most
decided change in the law in favor of the
same class.
This no doubt proceeds
from the fact that there is no other employment in which so great a number of
men are, at once, in such danger from
the carelessness of others, and so powerless to provide against it. But to make
the change in the law impartial and
thorough, the right to recover ought to
be extended to persons engaged in other
employments, who are exposed to unusual risks from their fellow servants,
which they cannot guard against. In
Both v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405, the plaintiff, a workman in a lumber yard, was
on a car piling lumber, and was injured
by the starting of the car. The employer
was held not liable. If the plaintiff had
been a railroademployee, doing the very
same work, no doubt he would have recovered damages.
The ground upon which the changes in
the law which we have been surveying
must stand, we take to be the weakness
of the defence of common employment,
when it rests upon an assumption of law,
and not upon ascertained facts. The
circumstances of many, if not most cases,
make it absurd to pretend that the injured party could have insured his safety
by watching others in the same service.
Take, as an example, the leading case
quoted at the beginning of this paper,
that of an engineer hurt by the carelessness of a switch-tender. If the law is to
remain unchanged, let it be upon the
ground that the servant assumes the risks
incident to his employment, a conclusion
which though it may sometimes bear hard,
is reasonable enough.
Never was it more important than it is
now, when the tendency in every department of thought is to pass authority by,
and search into the causes of things, that
the law should commend itself to the
plain sense of men in its reasonings as
well as its rules.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY SAVAGE.
Philadelphia.
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The Supreme Court of New York.
KINGMAN v. FRANK.
Wlfere a married Woman, having a separate estate or business, employs her husband to manage the same, and agrees to pay him a stated compensation tbr his services, a chose in action in his favor against her is created, which, on her failure to
pay, can be reached by a judgment creditor of the husband.
APPEAL from a judgment entered upon an order sustaining a
demurrer to a complaint.

J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought by the plaintiff as a judgment creditor of
the defendant Gustave Frank, after the issuing and return of an
execution unsatisfied against his property. The only property which
it was alleged he had that was applicable to the payment of the
judgment, was a debt of $1040 owing to him from his wife. This
debt was alleged to have arisen for services performed by him in her
employment, under an agreement by which she agreed to employ
him to manage and superintend a separate business carried on by her
as a dealer in dry goods and notions, for which she agreed to pay
him eight dollars a week. It is further alleged that he entered upon
the performance of the agreement, and continued under it in her
service until the alleged indebtedness had accrued in his favor.
The demurrer was served upon the alleged ground that these
facts did not constitute a cause of action, and it was sustained by
the court for the reason that the husband himself could not enforce
the payment of his salary by an action against his wife.
That she should employ him as she did to perform services for
her in her separate business, resulted from the statutory provision
empowering her to carry it on the same as though she was an unmarried woman, and the existence of that power of employment derived
from this statutory authority has already received the sanction of
the courts: Fairbanks v. Alothersell, 60 Barb. 406: Abbey v.
ieyo, 44 N. Y. 843; Foster v. Perseh, 68 Id. 400.
As she could enter into a lawful contract for the employment of
her husband in this manner, and has been required by the statute
to be considered as a feme sole in the exercise of the authority conferred upon her, it would seem to follow that she could obligate and
bind herself for the payment of the stipulated compensation. From the
facts made to appear, the sum of money alleged in the complaint, has
DANIELS,
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been earned by him, and become payable from her for the performance of his services under a lawful agreement entered into by her,
and it is to be presumed in support of the plaintiff's action that she
would be willing to pay over the amount voluntarily to him in satisfaction of his demand against her husband, as soon as the legal
right to receive payment shall be acquired in these proceedings from
her husband. Certainly the court has no ground to assume, and
for that reason to defeat the action, that she would not honestly and
fairly perform her contract by payment of the money as soon as the
plaintiff shall be placed in a position where he would have a legal
right to receive it.
But it will not follow from the inability of the husband to collect
the debt by means of legal proceedings, that the plaintiff would be
prevented from doing so by reason of the same disability, if it
should be considered to exist. For this disability would extend no
further than to affect the remedy, and would not stand in the way
of the plaintiff to recover the debt, or of a receiver appointed for
that purpose under a proper judgment of this court. To warrant
such a recovery all that would seem to be necessary is an obligation
on the part of the wife to pay the money, and that obligation has
been created by her contract and the performance of her husband's
services under it. These facts together with the acquisition of the
demand by the plaintiff, or by a receiver in the action, would be all
that could be legally required to maintain an action for the recovery
of the debt. In this respect the case would resemble that of a foreign executor or administrator who while he could not maintain an
action in this state to recover a demand due to the testator or intestate might still assign it to another person, who could upon the title
so acquired, successfully prosecute such an action. And that an
assignee might in like manner recover this demand would seem to
follow from the principle of Fitch v. Bathbone, 61 N. Y. 576.
For if the assignee of the wife may maintain an action against her
husband for the conversion of her property, it would seem to follow
that the assignee of the husband might also maintain an action
against the wife to recover the amount of an indebtedness she had
lawfully incurred to her husband.
The case of Perkins v. Perkins,2 Barb. 561, when its circumstances are considered, will not appear to be an authority sustaining
the conclusion arrived at by the special term. The other authorities as well as the result of the statute to which reference has been
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made, appear to be sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain this
action, and to obtain satisfaction of his demand out of the legal
obligation created against the wife in favor of her husband.
The judgment should be reversed with costs, and judgment
shbuld be directed for the plaintiff on the demurrer, with leave to
the defendants to withdraw the demurrer and answer in twenty days
on payment of the costs of the demurrer and of this appeal.
DAVIS, P. J., and BRADY, J., concur.
The capacity of a married woman to
have and to deal with her separate estate,
and to contract, and to trade and do business, comes from the equity doctrine, and
the respective state statutes ; yet the
question involved in the foregoing case,
is of general application, and not limited
by statutory restrictions.
In the above case it was held that the
husband's wages, due from his wife for
his services under contract in her separate business, are subject to his debts.
But the question of general interest is
whether or not the husband's creditors
can reach the fruits, products or results
of his labor, skill and industry, created
in the conduct or management of his
wife's business or estate.
As a rule; this product or result is first
his wages, or compensation, when it is
agreed that he shall receive compensation,
or secondly, it is the benefits, increase or
profits, which his wife's separate estate
or business receives from that labor and
skill, when there is no such agreement for
compensation.
In the former case the benefits from
the husband's labor and skill accrue to
the husband, and in the latter case, to the
wife. In the former case, it is based on
agreement for compensation, and in the
latter it is not. The courts hold,
that in the former case the product
of the husband's labor and skill, to wit:
his wages or compensation are subject to
his debts, and in the latter case, such product to wit: 1. When his labor is bestowed gratuitously on her separate estate
or in her business. 2. When there is no

agreement for compensation ; and 3,
when he gratuitously makes improvements upon her separate estate, are not
subject to his debts.
In any case, the subject-matter and the
thing which the husband's creditors want,
is the fruit, product or result, of the
husband's labor. Because one is not
gratuitous the product is liable, and be
cause the other is gratuitous, such product is not liable.
It is not gratuitous when it is agreed
that he receive compensation for his
labor, and it is gratuitous when there is
no agreement for compensation for his
labor, or for his improvements on her
property.
The husband's creditors want this product, or result, or fruit of the husband's
labor, no matter under what form it may
appear. If they can reach it when it is
in the form of an agreement for compensation, there can be no logical reason
why they should be prevented from reaching it when not produced under the form
of suph agreement.
In consequence of the great contrariety
of the opinions, and the unsatisfactory
condition of the reasons adduced, all the
decisions are here reviewed, and they
seem to settle the following : 1st. That the
husband'swages or compensation is liable.
2d. When he works without any agreement as to compensation, the product or
fruits of his labor and skill are not liable.
3d. When he voluntarily places improvements or repairs on her separate property, such improvements or repairs,
cannot be touched by his creditors.
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The first is settled as stated, by the An arrangement by which the husband
weight of authority.
acts as his wife's agent, without any
With respect to the second, Mr. Bump, compensation or for an insufficient com(Fraudulent Conveyance 269), states pensation is, in effect, an attempt to
that the conclusions deducible from the make a voluntary conveyance of the prodecisions are that the law will not com- ducts of his skill and lhbor in her favor,
pel a debtor to earn money to pay his and is void against his creditors. She is
debts; hence lie can labor or not. If entitled to her money with interest, and
hd labor he can limit his earnings to ac- the balance will be appropriated to the
tual subsistence, or to the support of
payment of his debts."
himself and family. He is under no legal
These deductions are not whollysatisor moral obligation to appropriate his factory, nor entirely accurate, nor fully
earnings to the benefit of his creditors, and in accord with the cases cited. The
leave himself and family to suffer from ruling in Leslie v. Jolner, 2 Head 514,
hunger and want; and after a contract was based upon that in Hamilton v. Zimhas been partially performed, he may re- merman, 5 Sneed 39, where the court
fuse to complete it, and a new arrange- stated that whilst the husband is under a
ment may be made for the purpose of positive obligation in law and morals to
protecting his subsequent earnings; but support his wife and family, IIhe cannot
he cannot make an assignment of his make it the pretext for covering up and
future earnings with the intent to delay, protecting from the just claims of credhinder or defraud his creditors. But itors any surplus fund accruing from his
beyond the necessary wants of himself labor or vocation, whatever it may be."
and family, there is a limit which the Grfflln v. Cranston, I Bosw. 281, held
valid an agreement of an insolvent to
law does not allow him to transcend.
He is not permitted to treasure up a fund work for his board, unless future profits
accruing from his labor or vocation, what- were earned in consideration of an asever it may he, and claim that it shall be signment where the assets were not suffiprotected for the benefit of himself and cient to pay his debts. In Holdship v.
Patterson, 7 Watts 547, the court held
family against the demaid of creditors.
valid the husband's agreement to work
Every agreement or contrivance entered
into with a view to deprive his creditors for the subsistence of his family, and
of his future earnings, and enable him that such products or results of his labor
to retain and use them for his own benefit were not subject to the payment of his
debts; stating that the husband was "at
and advantage, or to make a permanent
provision for his family, is fraudulent liberty to dispose of his services for his
and void. Although his creditors can- own purposes and on his own terms.
not compel him to labor for the purpose His tangible earnings would become liaof satisfying their demands, yet they able to execution for his debts ; but he
have a just claim in law upon the ftuits was not under even a moral obligation
of his labor. The law does not permit to restrict his efforts exclusively to the
him to carry on a business in the name liquidation of them. He might lawfully
devote himself to the maintenance of his
of his wife, so as to invest the proceeds
of his skill and labor in her name. If family only." The ease of Teeter v.
Williams, 3 B. Mon. 562, was an attachshe has a separate estate, she may employ him and compensate him for his ment of a sum actually due, and it was
services, but the employment must be in held that the court had no power to compel a debtor to perform a contract for
good faith and not merely colorable. If
the character of an agent is assumed in labor, so that the creditor may have the
an improper case, the law disregards it. benefit of the price, and in any case the
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court would not fail to allow the debtor
out of the proceeds of his labor sufficient
for the support of himself and family.
Tripp v. Childs, 14 Barb. 85, was decided on the ground of positive fraud
and-does not support the text: Graggv.
Martin, 12 Allen 498, held invalid an
assignment of future wages when made
for the purpose of preventing such wages
from being attached.
In Pattersonv. Campbell, 9 Ala. 933,
the parent invested the fruits of his labor
in real estate and took the title in the
name of his infant daughter. It was
urged that the debtor had the right to
appropriate the proceeds of his labor to
the advancement of his children in preference to his creditors, but the court
held that he could provide a support but
not by "investing them with the title to
property, which in most if not all cases,
must necessarily be a secret trust enuring to the benefit of the parent."
In Waddingham Ex. v. Loker, 44
Mo. 132, although it was held that property donated to the wife and daughters
of a debtor could not be touched by the
husband's creditors, the court stated
that the law will not permit a man to
withdraw his property from his creditors; nor, if in debt, permit him to
devote his capital, industry or credit
to the accumulation of property for his
own use or the use of his family, to the
exclusion of his creditors.
In Isham v. Schafer, 60 Barb. 317,
the question was whether or not the
money and labor furnished by the husband in the erection of a house upon
his wife's separate property, was subject to the payment of his debts ? The
court stated that if the debtor contributed something in the nature of property, it could be reached. " Something
which the creditor had the right to claim
as property, and which could be appropriated and converted into money by
legal process to satisfy a debt or demand. If it was something else, such
as the mere labor or skill of the debtor

gratuitously bestowed, no such relief
could be had on account of it. The law
gives the creditor a lien and claim
upon the property of his debtor, upon
the fruits of his labor and skill when
received or earned, but no lien or claim
upon his capacity to labor, or upon his
skill and ingenuity. His labor and skill,
upon which a creditor has no lien or
claim of any kind, the debtor may, if he
sees fit, give away to another, and the
creditor can have no remedy against the
recipient, if it is in fact a mere gift.
And so it has been held, that a husband
who acts as agent for his wife and oversees her affairs gratuitously, does not
thereby render his wife liable to his
creditors for what such services might
be -worth if compensation were to be
made."
Bucdley v. Wells, 33 N. Y.
518.
The object in Quidort, Admr. v. Tergeaux, 3 C. E. Green 472, was to
subject property in the wife's name,
acquired by the joint efforts of husband
and wife in a certain business, to the
satisfaction of the husband's debts, and
the court held the affirmative, stating,
"while a husband may, as against his
creditors, allow his wife to have for her
separate use the earnings of herself and
the labor of their minor children, he
may not give to her, to be invested in
her own name, the proceeds of his own
business, skill and labor. Else it would
follow that any married man who became embarrassed could transfer his
business to his wife, and continue it
himself in her name with all his skill
and ability ; and if she only took or
seemed to take some part in the transaction of it, might invest the proceeds
of his labor and management in the
name of his wife and set his creditors at
defiance."
The court, in Keeney v. Good, 21
Penn. St. 349, stated that a husband
"cannot be prevented from applying
the fruits of his personal industry to the
maintenance and education of his family ;
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for the wages of his labor are not liable
to attachment. But after supporting his
famnily he must give the best exertions of
his mind and body to his creditors. This
is but his reasonable duty-a duty sanetioned by all laws, moral, civil and
But the facts in this case
divine."
showed that the property and business
were purchased on credit, and much of
the purchase-money paid from the profits
of the business, although carried on by
the husband in the name of the wife.
The question was under these facts, who
owned the hogs purchased by the husband with money derived from that
business ? The same court used different language in Rush v. Vought, 5 P. F.
Smith 437, where the question was,
whether or not the products of the
wife's farm, produced by the labor of
her husband and minor children, were
liable for his debts, and held they
were not, stating that there is no law
which compels a debtor to labor for
his creditors, or gives them a remedy
against his personal efforts. When his
labor is in the form of property, it is liable for his debts. He may gain a debt for
his wages but no title to the products, and
if lie labors for his maintenance alone, his
creditors have no remedy against the product. A husband who voluntarily labors
on his wife's farm, acquires no title to
such product, and hence, his creditors
cannot touch it. And see Mfanderbach v.
Mock, 5 Casey 43 ; Gillespie v. Miller,
1 Wright 247 ; McCullough v. Porter, 4
W. & S. 177, to the same effect. Yet,
in Bucher v. Ream, 18 P. F. Smith 421,
the stock and produce raised by the husband's labor on the farm rented by the
wife, were held liable for the husband's
debts; but this ruling was probably
based on the ground that the wife did not
have a separate estate to make the basis
for renting the farm, hence it was the
ljisband's property.
In NationalBank v. Sprague et al., 5
0. E. Green 22, the court held that "in
all cases where a business is carried on
VoL. XXXIII.-60

by husband and wife, in co-operation,
and the labor and skill of the husband
are contributed and united with those of
the wife, the business will be considered
as that of the husband, and not of the
wife, and the proceeds will not be protected for her as against his creditors."This case involved the primary question
of fraudulent conveyance, and the facts
that the wife had no prior separate estate,
and that she gave a power of attorney to
her husband, who was embarrassed, to
carry on, in her name, the business he
was then conducting, proved the intent
to defraud. But see Pawley v. Vogel,
42 Mo. 291.
The court, in Burger v. White, 2 Bosw.
92, stated that the fruits of the husband's
labor, or of the joint labor of husband
and wife, were subject to the husband's
debts, yet upon the facts in the case,
that the wife carried on the business herself, in her own name, with the husband's
knowledge, who neither assented or interfered, the court held that such business,
and the profits thereof were not liable for
the husband's debts.
The facts in Glidden, Murphin - Co.,
v. Taylor, 16 0. St. 509, were: The
husband, who had failed in the manufacturing business, started anew, in the same
business, with his wife's money, as her
agent and trustee. The wife gave no
personal attention to the business. The
business was successful, through the personal service and skill of the husband,
and the profits were, in part, used to support the family, part investedin property,
in the wife's name, and the husband used
part. There was no contract for compensation for the husband's services, and
no accounts were kept between them.
The court held the property, except the
amount the wife invested, subject to his
debts, stating that an arrangement between husband and wife, whereby the
husband undertook to carry on the business, in his wife's name, and for her
benefit, was a voluntary settlement of the
products of his skill and industry in favor
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of his wife, and hence, void as to creditors. The principle is the same whether
it affects property already acquired, or
only future acquisitions. And if the
wife suffers her money to be employed
by her husband, and blended with his
earnings, so that it cannot be separated,
though the business be conducted in her
name, the most favorable attitude she can
be allowed to assume, in a controversy with
his creditors, is that of a creditor in equity.
The same ruling, substantially, was made
in Shackleford v. Collier, 6 Bush 149,
where it was held that the property in
controversy, was, in part, separate
estate, and in part, the products of the
husband's labor, and that after securing
to the wife her interest, the "residue
was subject to the claims of the husband's
creditors," although if the property
accrued in consequence of the money or
property of the husband, subject to the
claims of antecedent creditors, the wife's
claim will generally be made to yield to
those of his creditors. This doctrine was
enunciated in Wilson v. Loomis, 55 Ill.
352; Brownell v. Dixon, 37 Id. 198 ;
Wortman v. Price, 47 Id. 22 ; Elijah v.
Taylor, 37 Id. 249 ; Dean v. Bailey, 50
Id. 481. The court, in Wilson v. Loomis,
stated that if a married woman place her
own funds (and a priori her property)
in her husband's hands, to carry on a
general trade in the wife's name, and the
husband, by his labor and skill, increase
the funds invested, the entire capital embarked in the enterprise, together with
the increase, may be held subject to the
claim of husband's creditors. It would
be, said the court, as unlawful for the
husband to appropriate the result of his
labor and skill to the exclusive use of his
wife, as her separate property, as it
would be to thus appropriate his money,
which, in either case, would be a fraud
upon his creditors. Brownell v. Dixon,
held a billiard table, and the profits of
the saloon business in the wife's name,
but managed by the husband, subject to
his creditors. Wortman v. Price held
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the products of the husband's labor, and
the stock purchased by the husband in
the wife name, with her funds, liable to
his creditors, the court stating that the
wife cannot appropriate the fruits of her
husband's time, skill and industry, when
he is in debt." She can make him her
azent, but she cannot do it so as to enable
him to engage in trade, manage it, devote
all his time and energy to it, and hold
the property so embarked, and the profits,
beyond the reach of his creditors." The
court, in this case, based its ruling not
alone on the prior Illinois cases, but
upon Freeman v. Orser, 5 Duer 476;
Sherman v. Elder, 24 N. Y. 383;
Wooster v. Northrup, 5 Wis. 245;
Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 471 ; Gage
v. Dauchy, 28 Barb. 622 ; Keeny v.
Good, supra, and Hallowell v. Horter,
35 Pa. St. 375; which are not entirely
in accord with the principle announced.
Although the court, in Dean v.
Bailey, supra, followed the prior rulings,
yet the case did not involve the question
under discussion. The facts were that
the wife owned the farm, stock and implements, and the family resided upon
it ; and the question was whether or not
the husband could exercise such general
use and control over the personalty as
would be consistent with his marital relations, without subjecting such property
to the claims of his creditors. See Elder
v. Cordray, 54 Ill. 244.
The New Jersey court announced a doctrine similar to that adopted in Illinois,
except that the creditors are limited to
the products or results of the husband's
labor: Skillman v. Skillman, 2 Beasley
409; Johnson v. Vail, I McCarter 423.
But as this court cited the New York
cases of Lovett v. Robinson, 7 How. Pr.
105 ; Avery v. Doane, 3 Am. L. Reg.
229, and Freeman v. Orser, 5 Duer 477,
it is probable the doctrine goes further.
The case of Fairbanks v. Mothersell,
60 Barb. 406, cited in the principal case,
contains expressions upon this subject:
but that case is only authority upon the
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.uestion that a married woman can employ her husband as her agent. A question now settled in the affirmative, as
shown by the cases cited in Kelly on
Cont. M. W. 178-185.
The Michigan case, Glover v. Alcott,
11 Mich. 471, announced that the fruits
of the husband's labor-namely, property
acquired in the business by means of the
nusband's labor-was liable to the claims
of his creditors. Although Judge CnnisIIAxeY

rendered

a

lengthy

opinion,

citing Gainberv. Gamber. 18 Penn. St.
366; Keeney v. Good, 21 Id. 349 ; Switzer v. Valentine, 10 How. Pr. 109;
Lovett v. Robinson, 7 Id. 105; Turd v.
Cass, 9 Barb. 366 ; Freeman v. Orser,
5 Duer 479 ; Raybold v. Raybold, 8
Harris 308 ; Marsh v. Hoppock, 3 Bosw.
479; Gage v. Dauchy, 28 Barb. 622 ;
yet the dissenting opinion of CAmPBELL,

T., seems the stronger and reasons more
closely.
A Virginia case, Penn v. Whitehead,
12 Gratt. 74, decided before the passage
of the enabling statutes, held that the
profits acquired in the wife's business by
the skill and labor of the husband were
subject to the claims of his creditors ;
but in this case the principles of the common law more or less applied to the
question involved.
On the other side of this question the
New York cases afford the best illustration. In Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277,
the husband carried on the business as
the agent of his wife, and the result of
his labor, amongst other things, was the
acquisition of certain cattle, which the
court held were not liable for his debts ;
stating, that where an insolvent engages
in business as the agent of the wife,
"there is more or less reason to suspect
that it is adoptbd as a cover to disguise
the ownership of the husband and to
defraud his creditors ; but whether it is
or not, is a question of fact for the jury
or other forum entrusted with the decision of such questions."
Bucley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 518, in-

volved the precise question, and the
court said : "The wife of an insolvent,
having a small separate estate derived
from her mother, is naturally desirous
that her husband may be engaged in
some business by which, in connection
with her estate, a support may be provided for a large family of children.
The husband had been a merchant. The
wife is willing to embark her property in
that business with which her husband
was familiar, hazardous though it be;
and she empowers him to carry on such
business for her, on her money and
credit, holding himself out to the world
as her agent. There was nothing
fraudulent in that. There is no law
which mortgages to the creditor either
the person or the labors of his debtor.
The duty rests upon him to use his best
efforts for the payment of his debts ; but
there is a duty which he owes alike to
the public and to his family which is
sacred, and that duty is to provide for
the nurture, education and support of his
children. In seeking employment for
that purpose, he may apply to the wife,
if she have a separate estate, as well as
to a stranger. The law allows her to
hold property, and, of necessity, must
allow her to manage it herself or employ
others to do it for her. As to that separate property, she and her husband are
as distinct before the law as if the marital
relation did not exist, and can employ
him and compensate him for the management of such property." Draper v.
Stouvenel, 35 N. Y. 507, accords with
this, and Sherman v. Elder, 24 N. Y.
381, contains a dictum against it. In
Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N. Y. 293, the
fruits of the husband's labor were the
crops which he raised on his wife's land,
and the court held they were not liable
to the claims of his creditors. This case
is followed and was controlled by Knapp
v. Smith.
The facts in Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y.
344, are in point. The husband, being
insolvent, carried on for his wife a large
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and profitable business in flour and feed,
devoting all his time and industry, but
did it under his own name of "Stephen
Abbey, agent." Tihe question raised was
whether or not the profits and acquisitions accruing by reason of the husband's
labor and skill were liable to satisfy the
claims of his creditors, and the court
held they were not. There was no agreement for the husband's compensation.
The court stated that the wife could engage in business and employ her husband
to manage it for her; whether it was a
device to cover up his property was
a question of fact, and if he work for his
wife without compensation his creditors
cannot complain, have no claim on the
products of his industry, and cannot
compel him to earn wages for their benefit; and hence he can work for his
wife, or another, gratuitously or for
maintenance. Said the court : "In arguing this point the appellant's counsel
insists that the services, the time and talents of the husband are valuable, and he
has no more right to give them to his
wife, as against his creditors, than to
give to her his property to their prejudice. The one, he says, is as much their
property as the other. This is unsound.
The property of a debtor, by the laws of
all commercial countries, belongs to his
creditors. He must be just before he is
generous. He must pay before he gives.
Not so with his talents and his industry.
Whether he has much, or little or nothing, his first duty is the support of his
Foster v. Persch, 68 N. Y.
family."
400, contains expressions to the same
effect.
In Cooperet al. v. Ham et al., 49 Ind.
400, the court held that a husband has
the right to give his personal services
and skill to the management of his wife's
property and receive no compensation
but the support and maintenance of himself and family. And after a review of
a number of cases, the court held the
affirmative of, but did not decide the
questions discussed in the authorities,

which are whether the husband can, by
his labor and skill, add to and increase the separate property of his wife,
without giving his creditors the right to
have the proceeds and profits apportioned
between themselves and the wife ; or if
the earnings of the husband should be
invested in other property, in the name
of his wife, or if there should be money
coming to him for his services and skill,
which could be reached by a proceeding
in attachment or supplementary to execution.
Whilst the case of Pattenv. Patten; 75
Ill.
446, does not decide the point in
conflict with the prior Illinois decisions,
yet the reasoning in the case approbates
the doctrine as advanced by the New
York cases.
The case of Rank-in v. WVest, 25 Mich.
195, seems to be in conflict with Glover
v. Alcott, supra. In that case the husband
was embarrassed. A vendor refu:ed to
sell to the husband, but sold to the wife.
The business was in the name of the
wife, but managed by the husband. The
goods in the business were levied upon
by the husband's creditors, and the court
held that such goods were not liable.
COOLEY, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, said: "We have heretofore held that a married woman may
carry on business in her own name, and
for that purpose may make herself liable
for purchases on credit: Tillman v.
Shcakelton, 15 Iich. 447 ; and as she
can do this, there is no reason why her
husband may not be her agent for this
purpose. If the husband, by reason of
his embarrassment, is unable to carry on
business and support the family in his
own name, it is no impediment to the
wife engaging in business for that purpose. It is a very sufficient and laudaable motive for her to do so. If the
property would never have come to husband or wife, except by the agreement
that she should be the purchaser and
carry on the business by means of it,
such purchase cannot wrong his cred-
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itors. Having the right to purchase and
carry on the business, it cannot form the
subject of complaint that she purposed
to keep the property beyond the reach of
her husbanl's creditors."
In Keller v. Mayler, Straus 4-Baum,
55 Ga. 406, the wife borrowed the
money, and started the business in her
nam'. hut managed by her husband as
her azent. The business increased repaid tihe borrowed money, and became
profitable. The husband gave his entire
time and attention to the business. There
was no agreement as to his compensation. The husband's creditor levied
upon the goods, claiming the products
of his labor, but the court held such
were not so liable. The court said :"If
the husband, in buying and selling, use
the wife's money for her in her business,
the goods are the wife's, not the husband's, and are not subject to his debts.
If lie be truly her agant, the fruits of his
agency belong to her. If, on the contrary, he is merely using the wife's
money with her consent in his own business, she is his creditor for the principal
advanced, with interest, and the stock
and all accumulations are his, and the
rights of his creditors attach."
In Feller v. Alden, 23 Wis. 301, the
question was whether or not the products
of the husband's labor, to wit, the crops
raised on his wife's lands, were subject
to his debts ; and although the court held
that they were not, following and citing
the New York cases, including Owen v.
Cawley, 36 N. Y. 601, yet the court
stated "whether equity will determine
the value of the husband's labor and
apportion it to his creditors is not raised
in this case.
Some such relief was
granted in Glidden v. Taylor, 16 0. St.
509, which.seems reasonable and just."
A good exposition of the doctrine was
given by the court in Ashhurst v. Given,
5 W. & S,323, stating, " A man though
indebted and wholly unable to pay anything, may dispose of his personal services at what price he pleases, and his
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creditors cannot object. If he be content to give them for his mere support
and maintenance, he has 6 right to do
so, though, I would say, if he has it in
his power by means of his personal
services, even when he is destitute of
all other means, to support himself and
at the same time to pay his creditors, he
ought to do so. But if he does not
choose to do so, it cannot be tolerated
for a moment that his creditors shall be
permitted to seize upon whatever has
been committed to his possession and
care, to be managed expressly for the
use and benefit of others and not for
himself."
The ruling that the products of the
husband's labor in conducting the wife's
business or property is not subject to his
debts, received the assent of the West
Virginia court in a well-considered
opinion in Miller v. Peck et al., 18 W.
Va. 75.
With respect to the third proposition
the rule is settled as stated, but the
reasons advanced are different: Barto's
Appeal, 5 P. F. Smith 386 ; Hughes v.
Peters, 1 Cold. 67 ; Knott v. Carpenter,
3 Head 417, 542; Litton v. Baldwin,
8 Id. 209; Capp v. Stewart, 38 Ind.
479; Robinson v. Htffman and Wife,
15 B. Mon. 80; Webster v. .Uildreth,
33 Vt. 457 ; Pierce v. Estate of Pierce,
25 Id. 511 ; White v. ITldreth and
Trustee, 32 Id. 265 ; Caswell v. Bill,
47 N. H. 407 ; Lynde v. McGregor, 13
Allen 182; Corning v. Fowler, 24 Ia.
584 ; Kirby et al. v. Burns et al., 45
Alo. 234; Love v. Graham, 25 Ala.
187. But in Kirby et al. v. Burns
et al., supra, it was held that such
improvements could be reached by
existing creditors of the husband:
Caswell v. Hill, 47 N. H. 407;
Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662;
Love v. Graham, 25 Id. 187. Such as
the value of lumber furnished: Hoot v.
Sorrell, 11 Ala. 386. And the excess:
Lynde v. McGregor,supra. There is no
liability even if the improvements were

